What is the standard of review of a court's ruling on a witness's assertion of privilege?

[30 Cal.Rptr.3d 504]

We have never specifically stated the standard of review of a court's ruling on a witness's assertion of the privilege. We review deferentially the trial court's resolution of any factual disputes. (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) The Attorney General argues that a similar deferential standard applies to the ultimate ruling that the witness may assert the privilege. We disagree, at least when the ruling affects a defendant's right to confront witnesses. When, as here, the relevant facts are undisputed, an appellate court should review independently the trial court's ruling permitting the witness to assert the privilege. In People v. Cromer, supra, we considered the closely similar question how an appellate court should review a trial court's finding that the prosecution exercised due diligence to locate a missing witness. We found the proper standard to be "independent, de novo, review rather than the more deferential abuse of discretion test." (Id. at p. 893, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) Much of Cromer's reasoning applies here. One of the reasons we gave is that independent review "comports with this court's usual practice for review of mixed question determinations affecting constitutional rights." (Id. at p. 901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) Here, as in Cromer, the ruling we are reviewing affects the constitutional right of confrontation. (Id. at p. 896, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) We conclude that the independent standard of review we applied in Cromer to a finding of due diligence also applies to a finding that the witness could assert the privilege against self-incrimination.

[30 Cal.Rptr.3d 504]