What is the impact of a prosecutor's pretrial constitutional failure to guard against improbity in the trial process?

In conclusion, the clear defects in Bowie's trial were the direct result of the prosecutor's pretrial constitutional failure to guard against improbity in the trial process, a failure which rendered the trial itself patently unfair in due process terms. The prosecution saw fit without prophylaxis to call to the stand witnesses whom it had clear reason to believe might have conspired to lie under oath. The manner in which the trial unfolded leaves us with the definite conviction that the process itself lacked fundamental fairness and delivered a palpably unreliable result. In this connection, the principles which compel our decision here are not designed to punish society for the misdeeds of a prosecutor, see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 n.17 (1976), but to vindicate the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial, a fundamental right for which the prosecution shares responsibility with the courts.