Does the failure to bifurcate the trial on the gang enhancements to a single charge constitute a due process violation?

The undersigned finds that the failure to bifurcate the trial on the gang enhancements did not rise to the level of a due process violation. "The simultaneous trial of more than one offense must actually render [a habeas] petitioner's state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process before relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 would be appropriate." Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir.1991). "The requisite level of prejudice is reached only 'if the impermissible joinder had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). "In evaluating prejudice, the [federal habeas court] focuses particularly on cross-admissibility of evidence and the danger of 'spillover' from one charge to another, especially where one charge or set of charges is weaker than another." Id. "[T]he risk of undue prejudice is particularly great whenever joinder of counts allows evidence of other crimes to be introduced in

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a trial where the evidence would be otherwise inadmissible." Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000). The danger in these situations is that the jury may find it difficult "to compartmentalize the damaging information." Id.