Does the trial judge erred in denying a post-trial motion for a new trial based upon alleged violations of sequestration order by members of the jury or marshals assigned to supervise the jury?

Appellant also contends that the trial judge erred in denying his post-trial motion for a new trial based upon alleged violations of the court's sequestration order by members of the jury or marshals assigned to supervise them. Where an unauthorized private communication, contact, or tampering with a juror during a trial does not relate to a matter pending before the jury, there is no right to a new trial absent a showing of prejudice by the defendant. See United States v. Berger, 433 F.2d 680, 686 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962, 91 S.Ct. 970, 28 L.Ed.2d 246 (1971). Despite an unauthorized and systematic post-trial investigation of jurors on his behalf with the knowledge of his attorney, ⁴ appellant failed to show that any communications or contacts made during unauthorized juror visits to homes, beauty parlors, and barber shops, or unauthorized telephone calls, related to matters pending before the jury, or prejudiced him in any way. In such circumstances, even if it is assumed that a hearing should have been held on these allegations (see United States v. Gersh, 328 F.2d 460, 464 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 992, 84 S.Ct. 1919, 12 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1964)), the lack of a hearing would at most be harmless error.