What is the burden of a motion to sever properly joined charges?

charged offenses and relief will obtain only on a clear showing of prejudice to establish the trial court's abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 214.) To establish that the denial of a motion to sever properly joined counts amounted to a prejudicial abuse of discretion, the defendant must demonstrate that the court's ruling exceeded the bounds of reason. (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 848.)

Four criteria used to determine whether the burden has been met "are these: (1) would the evidence of the crimes be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) are some of the charges unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) has a weak case been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence on the joined charges may alter the outcome of some or all of the charged offenses; and (4) is any one of the charges a death penalty offense, or does joinder of the charges convert the matter into a capital case. [Citation.]" (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 27-28.)

Based upon the evidence presented at trial Mills contends that the first three factors apply here. The trial court's discretion must be reviewed on the basis of the information before the court at the time of its ruling on a motion for separate trials. (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774.) Before the court in this case were the motion, opposition, and oral argument.

The consolidation motion contained a brief summary of each robbery showing that all three robberies were quick strong-arm robberies of strangers on the street, committed within a short period of time (during the month of January 2013); and the prosecutor represented that the facts would be cross-admissible to show modus operandi and identity. With regard to the first factor, the court found that evidence would be cross-admissible in separate trials. We agree that at that stage of the proceedings the facts suggested a common plan and demonstrated potential cross-admissibility. (See People v. Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 849.) This "'factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court's refusal to sever properly joined charges.' [Citations.]" (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 38.)