In arguing that the trial court abused its power to deny a motion to sever an indecent exposure charge from a sexual assault charge, does defendant rely on Earle v Earle to argue that the motion was abused?

In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion, defendant relies on People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372. Defendant's reliance on Earle is misplaced. In Earle, this court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever an indecent exposure charge from a sexual assault charge. (Id. at pp. 378-379.) In reaching our holding, we explained that the "charges arose from entirely distinct and dissimilar incidents with no apparent historical connection to one another," and that the sexual assault charge "was considerably weaker" than the indecent exposure charge. (Id. at p. 378.) Here, as previously discussed, the charged offenses all involved sexual violence against females who were connected to a particular family unit. We have also already explained that a weak case was not joined with a strong case. Thus, unlike Earle, the charges against defendant were not dissimilar and unconnected, and no charge

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