How have jury instructions been interpreted in the context of sexual assault cases?

Finally, we reject the contention the jury instructions reduced the People's burden of proof. Mejia relies on People v. Owens (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1155, in which the court concluded regarding a challenged instruction that, "Instructing the jury that the People have introduced evidence 'tending to prove' appellant's guilt carries the inference that the People have, in fact, established guilt. This inference would be eliminated if the phrase 'for the purpose of showing' was substituted for 'tending to prove,' so that the instruction would read: 'The People have introduced evidence for the purpose of showing that that there are more than three acts. . . . ' " (Id. at p. 1158.) Nonetheless, the court concluded any instructional error was harmless in light of the entire instructions given. (Id. at p. 1159.) Here, the instructions did not reduce the People's burden of proof. Rather, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 220 regarding the presumption of innocence, and the People's burden of proof. The instruction states, "Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not guilty."