How have instructions in a sexual assault case been interpreted in the context of an accomplice's testimony?

Relying on Cool v. United States (1972) 409 U.S. 100, defendant argues the above instructions were imbalanced because they singled out a certain type of evidence, telling the jury it could use the evidence to infer guilt, but failing to tell the jury it could rely on the evidence to acquit. In Cool, the defense relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice, who admitted his own guilt and insisted the defendant had no culpability. The trial court told the jury the accomplice's testimony should be viewed with suspicion, but it could be considered if the jury was "'convinced it is true beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (Id. at p. 102.) The trial court further instructed the jury that the accomplice's testimony, if believed, could "support your verdict of guilty." (Id. at p. 103, fn. 4.)