How have courts interpreted the statutory language of the Sexual Offences Prevention Act (SVPA) in the context of sexual assault cases?

Our high court in People v. Williams rejected that argument and concluded that the SVPA "inherently encompasses and conveys to a fact finder the requirement of a mental disorder that causes serious difficulty in controlling one's criminal sexual behavior." (People v. Williams, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 759.) The court further concluded that jurors instructed with the statutory language "must necessarily understand the need for serious difficulty in controlling behavior" (id. at p. 774, fn. omitted), and that no "further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA." (Id. at pp. 774-775, fn. omitted.)

Because we are bound to follow the holding in People v. Williams and because our high court there stated that a "commitment rendered under the plain language of the SVPA necessarily encompasses a determination of serious difficulty in controlling one's

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