California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Cheong v. Antablin, 16 Cal.4th 1063, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 (Cal. 1997):
Nor does citation to a terse Law Revision Commission comment persuade me the presumption arising under section 669 " 'is one of simple negligence only' " (conc. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 869 of 68 Cal.Rptr.2d, at p. 827 of 946 P.2d, quoting Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code (1995 ed.) foll. 669, p. 264), irrespective of the context. The commission's comment is not explained, and its sole support, a 1931 Court of Appeal opinion, held only that the particular jury instructions in that case, including one stating, "the violation of the speed statute was simple negligence" and "that alone was not sufficient to constitute gross negligence," were as a whole fair to the defendant. (Taylor v. Cockrell (1931) 116 Cal.App. 596, 599, 3 P.2d 16.) In the same comment, when describing the effect of the statutory presumption, the commission states, "if it is established that a person violated a statute under the conditions specified in [the statute], the opponent of the presumption is required to prove ... that the violation of the statute was reasonable and justifiable under the circumstances." (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foll. 669, p. 264.) In this respect, therefore, the comment seems to suggest, as the plaintiff here argued, that if a plaintiff who is a participant in an active sport is also a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by a statute, then section 669 may transform an
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