Can a court examine alternative methods of regulation in determining whether a director has acted capricious or arbitrarily?

Nor, in reaching this conslusion, can we consider alternative methods of regulation available to the department. '(I)n determining whether the director has acted arbitrarily [69 Cal.2d 180] or capriciously, this court does not inquire whether, if it had power to draft the regulation, it would have adopted some method or formula other than that promulgated by the director. The court does not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body.' (Pitts v. Perluss, supra, 58 Cal.2d 824, 834--835, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 25, 377 P.2d 83, 89; compare, e.g., Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 501--502, 55 Cal.Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409 (judicial examination of alternative methods of regulation if constitutional rights impaired).) Thus, we do not consider whether, for example, the department would better have served the cause of fresh beer by requiring sale within a certain number of days after delivery or by requiring each retailer to have adequate refrigeration facilities. This court is in no position to attempt to reach an independent decision as to whether the department actually used the best method of accomplishing the statutory objective; even to undertake such a task would be to frustrate the legislative policy of reliance upon the special competence of the department. Our function narrows to a determination of whether the department used a method that was not arbitrary and capricious.