What is the test for determining derivative accomplice liability for natural and probable consequences of the target crime?

Except for the last sentence, the People's position is untenable. Derivative accomplice liability for the natural and probable consequences of the target offense depends wholly on the knowing and intentional promotion or assistance of the originally contemplated crime. As People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318 instructs: "[T]he weight of authority and sound law require proof that an aider and abettor act with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense." (Id. at p. 560, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318, emphasis in original.) The People's theory--the perpetrator and accomplice need not intend to commit the same target crime, or that the target crime need not be committed at all--undermines the very foundation of accomplice liability.