Can a defendant be held criminally responsible as an accomplice not only for the crime he intended to do but also for any other crime that is a natural and probable consequence of the crime?

"[A] defendant may be held criminally responsible as an accomplice not only for the crime he or she intended to aid and abet (the target crime), but also for any other crime that is the `natural and probable consequence' of the target crime." (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261.) The same principle applies under the law of conspiracy for the acts of a coconspirator. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 188.) "Liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine `is measured by whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted.' [Citation.]" (People v. Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920.) Thus, "`[t]he . . . question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)