What is the test for an abuse of discretion when the trial court's ruling in a case of consolidation for the purposes of the consolidated pleading?

We review the trial court's ruling with regard to consolidation for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 408.) "A court abuses its discretion when its rulings fall `outside the bounds of reason.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) "Because consolidation ordinarily promotes efficiency, the law prefers it. `Joinder of related charges, whether in a single accusatory pleading or by consolidation of several accusatory pleadings, ordinarily avoids needless harassment of the defendant and the waste of public funds which may result if the same general facts were to be tried in two or more separate trials [citation], and in several respects separate trials would result in the same factual issues being presented in both trials.' [Citation.] Thus `[a] defendant can prevent consolidation of properly joined charges only with a "clear showing of prejudice"....' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 409, fn. omitted.)