What is the standard of review for a motion to dismiss an allegation of incurably prejudicial prejudice?

Indeed, " '[w]hether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.' " (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 986.) "Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial requires a nuanced, fact-based analysis." (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 369-370.) The trial court is in a better position to judge in the first instance the level of prejudice resulting from inadmissible evidence being revealed to the jury. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge, who was a witness to the incident and the jury's reaction. Accordingly, we decline to review defendant's claim under the de novo standard of review and instead will use the traditional abuse of discretion standard reserved for claims involving the denial of a mistrial motion. (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 953, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)