What is the meaning of the word "futile" in the context of an administrative claim?

1. Giano uses "futile" in the sense of "ineffective," meaning that his administrative claims against the defendants were "futile" because he was unlikely to succeed on them in an administrative setting in light of the fact that the defendants were prison administrators and correctional officers. We accept that meaning for purposes of this opinion. Other courts have used "futile" in a sense that is closer to "unavailable." See, e.g., Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 66-67 (3d Cir. 2000).

1. Giano uses "futile" in the sense of "ineffective," meaning that his administrative claims against the defendants were "futile" because he was unlikely to succeed on them in an administrative setting in light of the fact that the defendants were prison administrators and correctional officers. We accept that meaning for purposes of this opinion. Other courts have used "futile" in a sense that is closer to "unavailable." See, e.g., Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 66-67 (3d Cir. 2000).

2. Because counts two, three, four, and five are not subject to the exhaustion requirement and because count ten demands relief in the form of a preliminary injunction and a declaratory judgment, we need not determine whether the "exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) applies... where the relief requested is monetary and where the administrative appeal, even if decided for the complainant, could not result in a monetary award." Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (calling it "far from certain" that the exhaustion requirement applies in such circumstances).

2. Because counts two, three, four, and five are not subject to the exhaustion requirement and because count ten demands relief in the form of a preliminary injunction and a declaratory judgment, we need not determine whether the "exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) applies... where the relief requested is monetary and where the administrative appeal, even if decided for the complainant, could not result in a monetary award." Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (calling it "far from certain" that the exhaustion requirement applies in such circumstances).