When there is no express trust declared of the income of a trust fund, what is the effect of that statement of the law?

In the case of Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] A.C. 186, there is a statement of the law by Lord Davey, found at p. 198, “When there is no express trust declared of the income of a trust fund, it follows the destination of, and is an accretion to, the fund from which it is derived (unless there be words excluding that implication).”

The case, in my opinion, falls to be governed by the law as stated in Countess of Bective v. Hodgson (1864), 10 H.L.C. 656. The decision itself is not relevant but the Lord Chancellor (Lord Westbury) lays down as undoubted law certain principles “if a freehold estate be given by way of executory devise, there is no disposition of the property until that estate arises and becomes vested; and, consequently, in the meantime freehold property descends to the heir at law. Now, this is the consequence of the great principle or rule of law, that the freehold cannot remain in abeyance; but that rule has no application to bequests of personal estate. Consequently, if by a will the whole of the personal estate, or the residue of the personal estate, be the subject of an executory bequest, the income of such personal estate follows the principal as an accessory, and must, during the period which the law allows for accumulation, be accumulated and added to the principal. Subject to the prohibition against accumulation, the ownership both of the principal and interest of the personal estate so bequeathed, may remain in suspension until the executory bequest takes effect, provided it be so given that it must vest within the time allowed by the rule against perpetuities (p. 664).”