On the other hand, in James v. Richnell, 20 Q.B.D. 164; 57 L.J.Q.B. 113, the opposite view prevailed. There, the question was whether or not a solicitor, who had recovered judgment for a client under an ordinary retainer, had authority without special instructions, to engage in proceedings in interpleader. It was held that he had not. Wills, J., in his judgment, at p. 166 (20 Q.B.D.) says: Proceedings in interpleader are substantially a second action, and nothing but very strong authority would induce me to hold that the plaintiff as a solicitor had any right to embark in them without express instructions from his client * * * The fact that proceedings in interpleader are a second litigation is not disposed of by suggesting that for some technical purpose they are regarded as part of the original action. Names are nothing Interpleaded at the instance of the sheriff is not a natural consequence of a judgment in favour of the plaintiff in an action. It is another proceeding and it rests with the plaintiff to say whether he will or will not become a party to the new issue.
And the judgment of Grantham, J., is as follows: I am of the same opinion. If the precise point has not been already settle, I think we ma? very safely declare the law to be that under an ordinary retainer a solicitor is not entitled to engage in proceedings in interpleader without consulting his client and receiving special instructions. The only authority which the industry of counsel has discovered to the contrary is the dictum of Lord Selborne in Hamlyn v. Betteley [supra] to the effect that interpleader is “not an action, but a proceeding in an action.” This dictum, however, refers not to the present question, but to the forms of procedure tinder the Interpleader Acts.
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