What is the authority of the trial judge to withdraw a case from the jury?

Nor do I think effect can be given to his second ground of appeal. The authority of the trial Judge to withdraw a case from the jury is enunciated in the following oft-quoted statement of Willes, J., in Ryder v. Wombwell (1868) L.R. 4 Ex. 32, at p, 38, 38 L.J. Ex. 8: * * there is in every case, not merely in those arising on a plea of infancy, a preliminary question which is one of law, viz., whether there is any evidence on which the jury could properly find the question for the party on whom the onus of proof lies. If there is not, the judge ought to withdraw the question from the jury and direct a nonsuit if the onus is on the plaintiff or direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the onus is on the defendant. It was formerly considered necessary in all cases to leave the question to the jury if there was any evidence, even a scintilla, in support of the case; but it is now settled that the question for the judge (subject of course to review) is, * * not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is none that ought reasonably to satisfy the jury that the fact sought to be proved is established.

The circumstances under which such authority may be exercised by the trial Judge is discussed by eminent Judges in Skeate v. Slaters, Ltd. [1914] 2 K.B. 429, at p. 434, 83 L.J. K.B. 676, in which Lord Reading, C.J., delivers himself in part as follows: It was argued for the plaintiff that the learned judge, having left the case to the jury, could not subsequently alter his decision and enter judgment for the defendants. I do not agree with this contention. It is always open to a judge, if he thinks fit, to reconsider his decision that there was no case to go to the jury and to enter the judgment for the defendants if he is then of opinion that the plaintiff has failed to make a case against the defendants.