What is the test for a defendant’s right to retain and instruct counsel by telephone?

In Brownridge v. R. Laskin J. referred to the right to retain and instruct counsel as follows at p. 328: “The right to retain and instruct counsel without delay can only have meaning to an arrested or detained person if it is taken as raising a correlative obligation upon the police to facilitate contact with counsel. This means allowing him upon his request to use the telephone for that purpose if one is available. I am not concerned in this case with determining how many calls must be permitted. Here, on the facts, the accused was prevented from making even one. I am content to say for the purposes of this case that the accused’s right under s. 2(c)(ii) would have been sufficiently recognized if, having been permitted to telephone, he had reached his counsel and had spoken with him over the telephone. I would construe the right given by s. 2(c)(ii), when invoked by an accused upon whom a demand is made under s. 223(1), as entitling him to insist on the personal attendance of his counsel if he can reach him by telephone. I refrain from enlarging on the matters mentioned in this paragraph of my reasons because it is better that this be done when particular cases call for it.”