What are the principles of fundamental justice in the extradition context?

The Ontario Court of Appeal endorses this approach in Yang, supra, at pp. 244-45: The court must also take a contextual approach. Procedure that in one context would not comport with the principles of fundamental justice may accord with the principles of fundamental justice in an entirely different context. In Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1991), 1991 CanLII 78 (SCC), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at 51, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 438 (S.C.C.), McLachlin J. identified three elements that must be taken into account in identifying the principles of fundamental justice in the extradition context. They are reciprocity, comity and respect for differences in other jurisdictions. The implications of these contextual factors are profound. First and foremost, the courts are instructed not to impose Canadian standards upon our extradition partners. A foreign justice system is not fundamentally unjust because it does not recognize certain safeguards that we would consider principles of fundamental justice.

The court recognizes that Canadians may well be tried by a jurisdiction with a very different legal system from that of Canada. Sopinka J. said in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 75 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 590, “A mere common law rule does not suffice to constitute a principle of fundamental justice …”