As to any limitation periods, it would appear that insofar as any cause of action based on “tortious conduct” which is encompassed by the writ is concerned, that cause of action may well have its foundation in acts which occurred prior to the plaintiff being placed on sick leave on October 25, 1992. It may be, therefore, that if a new writ were issued, the defendant would have the benefit of an accrued limitation defence which would not be available if the action was commenced by the writ issued on October 24, 1992. However, as is apparent from Bearhead v. Moorehouse, supra, that factor is far from determinative. The plaintiff avoided the operation of any limitation defence which had not yet accrued when he issued his writ. A renewal of the writ would simply relieve against a procedural irregularity. Any limitation defence which had accrued prior to October 24, 1994 will, of course, still be available.
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