Can a trial judge place the defence of provocation before the jury if there is an air of reality to it?

It is not disputed that the trial judge had an obligation to place the defence of provocation before the jury if there was an “air of reality” to it. Equally, the trial judge was charged with the duty to refuse to do so if there was not. As Fauteux C.J. said in Parnerkar v. The Queen, 1973 CanLII 149 (SCC), [1974] S.C.R. 449, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 253, at p. 454: . . . Indeed and in all of the cases, the valid exercise of the function of the jury is, according to the very words of the oath of office taken by them, to give a verdict according to evidence. They cannot go beyond the evidence and resort to speculation nor, of course, would it be proper for the trial Judge to invite them to do so. If, then, the record is denuded of any evidence potentially enabling a jury acting judicially to find a wrongful act or insult of the nature and effect set forth in [s. 232], it is then, as a matter of law, within the area exclusively reserved to the trial Judge to so decide and his duty to refrain from putting the defence of provocation to the jury.