What is the test for making a sending order under s. 15 of the Charter?

Drawing on the analogy to s. 24(2) of the Charter and applying the values of the protection against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter, a judge hearing a s. 15 application is certainly not required to take a mechanical approach and refuse to make a sending order simply because the search warrant was defective. The core question under s. 8 of the Charter is "whether in a particular situation the public's interest in being left alone by government must give way to the government's interest in intruding on the individual's privacy [page774] in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement" (Hunter v. Southam, 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, at pp. 159-60 S.C.R.). The issue under s. 24(2) is whether allowing the authorities to use improperly seized items would "bring the administration of justice into disrepute". As I read his reasons, the application judge in this case carefully identified and weighed the appropriate competing concerns and concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, a sending order of selected items was appropriate despite the defective warrant. Another judge might well have reached a different conclusion, but I am not persuaded that this court should interfere with the exercise of the application judge's discretion in this case. Conclusion