Can a judge acting under section 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure make an order under the same section of the Order?

[16] In my view, the judge acting under section 37 in making the review may choose to make an order under one of the other subsections than that relied upon in the original order. It does not necessarily include the power to make an interim or a final order as the legislature would presumably have so stated in section 37 before making reference to any other order therein referred to. Subsection 37(2) broadens the area of consideration by making reference to those alternatives in section 34. For a court acting under section 37 to have jurisdiction to vary an order on an interim basis, it must find that jurisdiction in section 37. The question there is whether the incorporation by reference to section 34 includes the opening words as well as the alternatives recited there. The wording of section 37 and the context in which it is used causes me to conclude that the alternatives are referred to and not the whole section. Those opening words of subsection 34(1) are qualified by the phrase in an application under section 33. Subsection 34(1) is designed to feed section 33. For these reasons, I reject the analysis advanced in the case in Blaese v. Chornecki, supra.

[17] This takes me back to the question in relation to spousal support, the court must conclude either that there is an absence of express authority to grant an interim order or that the Rogers v. Rogers line of cases permits the court to grant interim orders in circumstances of hardship. In my view, the former should be followed. For the following reasons: 1. It does not create an artificial distinction between the treatment of motions for interim relief made under the Divorce Act and the Family Law Act. 2. The parties should be encouraged to get on with the trial of the matter without the encouragement of intermediate steps.