Can the contention that a trailer is not a structure be supported?

I am also of the view that the contention the trailer was not a structure cannot be supported. In Springman v. The Queen (1964) 1964 CanLII 69 (SCC), S.C.R. 267 it was held that the word "structure" in Section 374(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (now Section 389(1)(a)) is not to be construed ejusdem generis with the word "building" in that section though some characteristics are common to both. A trailer used as a bunkhouse in a construction camp and mounted on wheels for ease of movement from place to place was however, held not to be a structure since it was fundamentally movable property intended to be readily moved. Hall J. cited with approval the dica of Vaughan Williams J. in London County Council v. Pearce (1892) 2 Q.B. 109 at Page 112: "In all cases we must be guided by what I may call the intentions of the structure, and must inquire with what Intention it was made … when one looks into the intention with which the thing was made, it becomes plain that it was made for the purpose of locomotion and for erection in any place where it might be required."