What is the effect of vengeance on sentencing?

In saying this, I want to make it abundantly clear that this court is not and will not be influenced by public demands for vengeance against those who commit crimes. It is no part of the sentencing process to exact revenge against an accused. The point was forcefully made by Lamer C.J. in Regina v. M.(C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, in contrasting retribution with vengeance at paragraph 80. He said: As both academic and judicial commentators have noted, vengeance has no role to play in a civilized system of sentencing. Vengeance ... represents an uncalibrated act of harm upon another, frequently motivated by emotion and anger, as a reprisal for harm inflicted upon oneself by that person. Retribution in a criminal context, by contrast, represents an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender, having regard to the intentional risk-taking of the offender, the consequential harm caused by the offender, and the normative character of the offender’s conduct. Furthermore, unlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing more.