Is the natural and probable consequences doctrine applied to a crime committed before the crime was committed?

"For a criminal act to be a 'reasonably foreseeable' or a 'natural and probable' consequence of another criminal design it is not necessary that the collateral act be specifically planned or agreed upon, nor even that it be substantially certain to result from the commission of the planned act." (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 530.) "[T]he issue is a factual question to be resolved by the jury in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. [Citations.] Consequently, the issue does not turn on the defendant's subjective state of mind, but depends upon whether, under all of the circumstances presented, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted by the defendant. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 531.)

We hold substantial evidence supported a determination by the trial court the jury could reasonably find the victim's death was a natural and probable consequence of the specifically contemplated target offenses. It is true that no court has explicitly ruled on the propriety of application of the natural and probable consequences doctrine to a crime committed before (in this case, murder) the not inherently or potentially violent target offenses were committed. (People v. Kaufman (1907) 152 Cal.331, 334 [natural and probable consequences doctrine properly applied].) However, it is also true that no case has prohibited its application to non-violent offenses committed afterward.

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