Is the exclusionary rule interpreted in the federal courts?

Furthermore, I cannot ascertain from the majority opinion [44 Cal.2d 456] in the present case the nature of the rule which is being adopted to supplant the well established non-exclusionary rule in California. Is it the exclusionary rule as interpreted in the federal courts with all its technical distinctions, exceptions, and qualifications and embracing 'standards as to which (the United States Supreme) Court and its members have been so inconstant and inconsistent.' Irvine v. People of State of California, supra, 347 U.S. 128, 134, 74 S.Ct. 384. Apparently not, for the majority opinion here assumes the validity of the contention that 'the federal exclusionary rule has been arbitrary in its application and has introduced needless confusion into the law of criminal procedure.' But after making passing reference to possible 'needless refinements and distinctions' and 'needless limitations' found in the federal cases, the majority declares that this court is free to reject the rules established by such cases, and it concludes as follows: 'Under these circumstances, the adoption of the exclusionary rule need not introduce confusion into the law of criminal procedure. Instead it opens the door to the development of workable rules governing searches and seizures and the issuance of warrants that will protect both the rights guaranteed by the constitutional provisions and the interest of society in the suppression of crime.'