Is proximate cause for injury determined by the character of injury suffered?

To make proximate cause turn upon the character of injury suffered is a fallacious concept, inconsistent with our prior holdings. In Matter of People (Guardian Cas. Co.), 253 App.Div. 360, 2 N.Y.S.2d 232, affd. 278 N.Y. 674, 16 N.E.2d 397 the injury complained of occurred as follows: defendants, driving a taxicab and a private car collided with one another, and the taxicab came to rest against a stoop, dislodging one of the stones. Plaintiff, the operator of a laundry in the building, was called to the scene. When a tow truck attempted to pull the cab away from the stoop, the stone fell from the stoop, killing plaintiff. Although the injury was obviously different in kind from that which would have resulted from simple negligent driving, nevertheless, both drivers were held liable. In Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161, 362 N.E.2d 960 plaintiff was injured by an automobile when he wandered on to the highway. The negligence of the police officer there involved was in picking plaintiff up in the City of Kingston, intoxicated, and leaving him on its outskirts on a golf course, presumably to sleep it off. Again the injury suffered was wholly different from what would have resulted (illness, exposure) from the officer's negligent act considered by itself. So, also, a negligent defendant is liable for the full consequences of the medical malpractice of plaintiff's treating physician notwithstanding that those consequences may differ very substantially from the injuries inflicted by the negligent defendant (Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487).