Is evidence of crimes committed by a defendant other than those charged admissible?

"Evidence of crimes committed by a defendant other than those charged is inadmissible to prove criminal disposition or a poor character. '[B]ut evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, the existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator acted in the commission of the charged crimes. (Evid. Code, 1101.) Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent. [Citation.]' " (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1123 (Lenart).)

"To be relevant to prove identity, the uncharged crime must be highly similar to the charged offenses, while a lesser degree of similarity is required to establish relevance to prove common design or plan, and the least similarity is required to establish relevance to prove intent. [Citations.]" (Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) To establish relevance on the issue of common design or plan, " 'the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.' [Citation.]" (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371.) To establish relevance on the issue of intent, "the uncharged crimes need only be 'sufficiently similar [to the charged offenses] to support the inference that the defendant " 'probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.' [Citations.]" ' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) " '[T]he recurrence of a similar result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or

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good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act.' " (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402, superseded by statute on other grounds as explained in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911-913.)

"Finally, for uncharged crime evidence to be admissible, it must have substantial probative value that is not greatly outweighed by the potential that undue prejudice will result from admitting the evidence. [Citations.]" (Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) "Without a doubt, evidence a defendant committed an offense on a separate occasion is inherently prejudicial. [Citations.]" (People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047 (Tran).) But " '[e]vidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative . . . [only] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable "risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome" [citation].' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)