Is a voir dire ruling in a murder case reversible error?

Defendant argues the trial court's voir dire ruling is akin to the one we deemed reversible error in People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332. In Cash, the defendant was convicted of one count each of murder in the course of robbery and attempted murder. During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant killed his elderly grandparents when he was 17 years old. The jury returned a verdict of death. ( Id. at pp. 714, 717 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332].) On appeal, the defendant claimed the court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they would automatically vote for death if the defendant had previously committed another murder. During jury selection, the court had imposed a blanket rule restricting voir dire solely to the facts appearing on the face

[289 P.3d 846]

of the charging document. ( Id. at p. 719 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332].) We concluded that the court erred ... for two reasons. First, a trial court cannot absolutely bar mention of any fact or circumstance solely because it is not expressly pleaded in the charging document. ( Id. at p. 722 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332].) Second, and relevant to the evidence in that particular case, a prior murder was a general fact or circumstance that ... could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the strength of the mitigating circumstances....' ( Id. at p. 721 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332].) ( People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 839840, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 244, 234 P.3d 501.)