California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th 248, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013 (Cal. 1996):
In Woods, the defendant and a companion went in search of a rival gang member. They entered the apartment of two acquaintances of the member of the rival gang, and assaulted the occupants. As they were leaving, they saw two people getting into a car. The defendant's companion fired into the car, killing one occupant and injuring the other. At trial, the prosecution's theory was that the defendant was criminally responsible for the shootings committed by his companion, contending that the shootings were a natural and probable consequence of the crimes committed in the apartment that the defendant had aided and abetted. During deliberations, the jury asked, "Can a defendant be found guilty of aiding and abetting a murder in the second degree if the actual perpetrator of the same murder is determined to be guilty of murder in the first degree?" The trial court answered, "No." The Court of Appeal held that this answer was prejudicial error. (People v. Woods, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1579-1590, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 231.)
The Woods court reasoned that when the prosecution contends that the defendant is guilty as an accomplice under the "natural and probable consequences" doctrine, the defendant "does not stand in the same position as the perpetrator"; hence, "the aider and abettor and the perpetrator may have differing degrees of guilt based on the same conduct depending on which of the perpetrator's criminal acts were reasonably foreseeable under the [14 Cal.4th 276] circumstances and which were not." (People v. Woods, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. [926 P.2d 1030] 1586, 1587, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 231, italics omitted.)
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