Is a prior conviction that "necessarily involves moral turpitude" admissible to impeach a witness's testimony?

Evidence Code section 785 entitles a party to present evidence to impeach the credibility of any witness, including a criminal defendant. A prior felony conviction that "necessarily involve[s] moral turpitude" is admissible to impeach a witness' testimony. (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 306; cf. Cal. Const., art. I, 28, subd. (f)(4).) Escalera does not dispute that his prior felony conviction involved moral turpitude.

A trial court does not err by characterizing a prior felony conviction as "[a] felony involving moral turpitude" and, as a result, defense counsel has no constitutional duty to object to such a phrasing. (People v. Ballard (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 687, 698, fn. 6.) Escalera provides no contrary authority. He instead disputes the trial court's definition of "moral turpitude," and his trial counsel's acquiescence in one of the court's proposed definitions. He provides us with suggestions for a different definition of moral turpitude, but no authority showing it was error to define it as the court and parties agreed to do here. Indeed, he acknowledges the court's definition was "technically correct."

"Defense counsel need not make futile objections or motions merely to create a record impregnable to attack for claimed inadequacy of counsel." (People v.

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