Can a witness be impeached with any prior conviction involving moral turpitude?

"[A] witness may be impeached with any prior felony conviction involving moral turpitude, subject to the trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude it if it finds its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. [Citation.] The court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Because this discretion is broad, 'a reviewing court ordinarily will uphold the trial court's exercise of discretion.' [Citation.]" (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 407; see also Evid. Code, 788.)

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In addition, "[a] witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial court's exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352. [Citations.]" (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931, fn. omitted.)

"'When determining whether to admit a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, the court should consider, among other factors, whether it reflects on the witness's honesty or veracity, whether it is near or remote in time, whether it is for the same or similar conduct as the charged offense, and what effect its admission would have on the defendant's decision to testify.' [Citation.]" (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 722.)

Thus, defendant argues that the priors do not reflect on his honesty or veracity. Theft, however, is generally considered to "directly reflect[] upon the defendant's honesty and truthfulness." (People v. Foreman (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 175, 182; accord, People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 626 ["Grand theft necessarily involves . . . dishonesty"].)