Can a witness be impeached with a conviction for a violent crime that necessarily involves moral turpitude?

Subject to the trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352, a witness may be impeached with "any felony conviction which necessarily involves moral turpitude, even if the immoral trait is one other than dishonesty." (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 306.) At the same time, a witness may not be impeached with a felony conviction which does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. (Ibid.) "Moral turpitude" means a "readiness to do evil." (Id. at p. 314.)

"[I]n deciding whether a felony offered for impeachment necessarily involves moral turpitude, the trial court may look only to the 'least adjudicated elements' of the crime for which the witness was previously convicted. [Citation.] This concept simply means that in determining whether a previous felony involves moral turpitude the court cannot go behind the conviction and take evidence on or consider the facts and circumstances of the particular offense. Instead, the court must look to the statutory definition of the particular crime and only if the least adjudicated elements of the crime necessarily involve moral turpitude is the prior conviction admissible for impeachment purposes. [Citation.]" (People v. Mansfield (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 82, 87.) Considering its least adjudicated elements, a battery resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of section 243, subdivision (d) is not a crime that necessarily involves moral turpitude and may not be admitted for impeachment. (Id. at pp. 88-89.)

Defendant contends that defense counsel's performance was deficient because evidence of his prior battery conviction was inadmissible under People v. Mansfield, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 82, and thus there is no reasonable tactical basis for failing to object to the admission of evidence concerning his prior conviction and parole status for that conviction. Defendant asserts that defense counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because it "devastated" his "looking for love entrapment defense." This defense, defendant asserts, "depended heavily upon the jury believing he was entrapped by a voluptuous undercover officer." Absent the impeachment evidence showing his prior conviction for a violent offense and his parole status, defendant contends, he would have appeared before the jury as a "nice young man" who was "entrapped" as he was "looking for love and hugs."

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