How much deference does a judge have to show to the findings of fact of a trial judge?

Our deference to the findings of fact of a trial judge are not due only to his vantage point in observing the actors in the trial. See Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 661 (9th Cir.2003). Our deference also assumes that the judge is acting as our system prescribes, that he is not acting as a French magistrate-judge, still less as a prosecutor. If he were, the basis for deference is destroyed. We would be compelled to scrutinize his findings with the same independence with which we examine any prosecutorial assertion. Such a judge, like any prosecutor, we would assume to be acting in good faith to promote the purposes of the law. But such a judge would not be an impartial fact-finder whose findings control our judgment. We do not need to reach that degree of scrutiny here.