How have courts interpreted the Miranda warning?

In Berghuis, the case relied upon by the trial court, the defendant did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. "Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his ' "right to cut off questioning." ' [Citation.] Here he did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain silent." (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 382.)

"The prosecution therefore does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express. An 'implicit waiver' of the 'right to remain silent' is sufficient to admit a suspect's statement into evidence." (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 384.) Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. (Berghuis, at p. 385.)

We consider both voluntariness of the waiver and whether appellant was aware of the consequences of abandoning his rights. (People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 241.) On the issue of voluntariness, we consider whether the police exerted physical or psychological pressure or whether there were improper interrogation tactics. (Ibid.) On the issue of awareness, we consider whether defendant's judgment was clouded or otherwise impaired. (Id. at pp. 248-249.)