How have courts interpreted Miranda warnings in the context of the Miranda waiver?

"[T]he Miranda warnings are 'prophylactic' [citation] and need not be presented in any particular formulation or 'talismanic incantation.'" (People v. Walsh (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 236.) "The essential inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably '"[c]onvey to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda."'" (Id. at pp. 236-237; citing Duckworth v. Egan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 203 [same].)

"As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the prophylactic Miranda warnings are '"not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected"' [citation], and the warnings therefore need not be given in the exact form described in that decision [citation]. Thus, a reviewing court need not examine a Miranda warning for accuracy as if construing a legal document, but rather simply must determine whether the warnings reasonably would convey to a suspect his or her rights as required by Miranda." (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 830, citing to Duckworth v. Eagan, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 203.)

The People bear the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the suspect's Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent, and that his statement was voluntary and not obtained in violation of due process. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37

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