How have courts interpreted the Fifth Amendment in the context of an eminent domain claim?

"The power of a municipality to adopt zoning regulations pursuant to statutory authority is an essential aspect of the police power. The governing body must be free to exercise that power in good faith to amend or alter its zoning regulations when it determines the public interest so requires.' Veling v. Borough of Ramsey, 94 N.J.Super. 459, 228 A.2d 873 (1967).'

Town of Milton v. Brault, 132 Vt. at 380, 320 A.2d at 632--33.

1 The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the amendment. The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of the United States.

Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16, 54 S.Ct. 26, 27, 78 L.Ed. 142 (1933).

2 Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to just compensation was not secured against state action by the Fifth Amendment provision. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833).

3 We are by no means so unsophisticated as to suggest that an eminent domain proceeding as such requires some kind of procedural due process different from that otherwise guaranteed by law. Roberts v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264, 55 S.Ct. 689, 79 L.Ed. 1429 (1935).