How has the limitation period been interpreted in medical malpractice cases?

Similarly, in Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1622-1624, the appellate court determined there were no triable issues of fact on the question of when plaintiff suffered appreciable injuries caused by mold exposure. There was undisputed evidence plaintiff suffered from severe bouts of asthma and was hospitalized in the Summer of 1984. (Id. at pp. 1616-1617.) In October 1984, plaintiff had her condominium unit tested for mold contamination, retained a microbiologist to pinpoint the source of the mold, and her husband sent a letter to the defendant stating the flooding caused mold that caused plaintiff to suffer extreme allergic reactions a year earlier. (Id. at pp. 1617-1618.) Based on this evidence, the court concluded "reasonable minds can draw only one conclusionthat [the plaintiff] suffered appreciable and actual harm . . . and was also aware of its negligent cause by October 1984." (Id. at p. 1624, fn. omitted.) The court determined any misdiagnosis of her medical condition did not delay the limitations period because plaintiff injuries "constituted actual and appreciable harm" and she was well aware of its negligent cause. (Id. at p. 1625.) "She cites no authority for the proposition that a cause of action cannot accrue until a plaintiff can attach a medical diagnosis, whether correct or incorrect, to her condition . . . ." (Id. at p. 1625.)

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