Does the statute of limitations start to run from the date of discovery of an action for failure to diligently and promptly commence suit and attachment proceedings?

In Wheaton v. Nolan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 401, 39 P.2d 457, an action for failure of attorneys 'to diligently and promptly commence suit and attachment proceedings,' the court did not state when the statute started to run, but based its decision upon its finding that 'the allegations made to overcome the running of the statute of limitations were insufficient under the decisions of this state to accomplish that purpose. Means and sources of knowledge of the alleged breach and injury were at all times available to plaintiffs, and ordinary[215 Cal.App.2d 829] diligence on their part in consulting such means and sources would have furnished them with all the information sufficient to discover the breach and commence suit within the two-year period.' (p. 403, 39 P.2d p. 457.) The action against the attorneys was filed more than four years after the plaintiffs claimed to have been damaged by the ngligence of the attorneys. There is nothing in this case which gives comfort to plaintiff's contention that the true rule is that the statute does not start to run from the date of the negligent acts but from the date of discovery thereof.

In Lally v. Kuster (1918) 177 Cal. 783, 171 P. 961, an action against an attorney for negligence in allowing an action for the foreclosure of a note and mortgage to be dismissed for delay in prosecuting it, the attorney contended that the plaintiffs' right of action against him accrued at the time he first disobeyed the orders of his client to proceed diligently. This was approximately three years before the action was dismissed. The plaintiff claimed that the right of action against the attorney did not accrue until the dismissal of the other action. The court said that the question is not 'free from difficulty, and yet where the disobedience complained of consists in delay only, the cause of action cannot be said to arise until such delay has resulted in some injury, as it did when the court dismissed the case because of the delay.' (p. 791, 171 P. p. 964; emphasis added.)