How has the statute of limitations been interpreted for a defendant to plead and prove timely commencement of the action?

In People v. Lewis (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 816 (Lewis), the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. (Id. at p. 819.) After the crime was committed in 1980, a warrant was "promptly" issued for the defendant's arrest but he could not be located until 1984. (Id. at p. 820.) The information was filed more than three years after the crime was committed and did not include any tolling allegations. (Id. at p. 821.) For the first time on appeal, the defendant argued a defense under the statute of limitations, which was three years. (Id. at p. 821.) The court observed that "the failure to plead and prove facts showing timely commencement of the action was an error of jurisdictional proportions." (Id. at p. 821.) The court held, however, that "the error . . . was not prejudicial and [did] not require a reversal of the defendant's conviction. This [was] so because the issuance of a valid warrant for [the] defendant's arrest shortly after the commission of the crime [was] an undisputed fact and the issuance of the arrest warrant tolled the limitations period as a matter of law. The existence of an event tolling the period being an undisputed fact, the error in failing to plead that event or to prove it to the jury [was] harmless." (Ibid.)