California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Tuck v. Thuesen, 10 Cal.App.3d 193, 88 Cal.Rptr. 759 (Cal. App. 1970):
Numerous cases cited in the opinion, as well as cases decided subsequently, support this viewpoint. (See Eckert v. Schaal, 251 Cal.App.2d 1, 58 Cal.Rptr. 817; Griffith v. [10 Cal.App.3d 198] Zavlaris, 215 Cal.App.2d 826, 30 Cal.Rptr. 517.) Under the rule of these cases the statute would thus commence to run in the instant case upon April 22, 1964.
Appellant relies upon the case of Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal.2d 223, 74 Cal.Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161, as authority for postponed accrual of the statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions. There the allegation was that the defendant attorney was negligent in failing to fulfill his client's testamentary directions. The action was brought by the intended beneficiaries after the death of the testatrix. The court held that the limitations period did not commence to run until the attorney's negligence became irremediable upon the death of the testatrix. In so holding, the court point out that, until then, there was a continuing duty on the attorney to remedy his error and the rendering of legal services was not completed; that only then did the testatrix' reliance on the attorney's superior knowledge and skill cease. Furthermore, only upon the testatrix' death did the plaintiff, as an intended beneficiary, acquire any rights. 2
The grounds for applying a rule of postponed accrual in Heyer are absent in the instant case. First, there was no continuing duty on the part of the respondent to correct the error complained of because it was irremediable; the error was jurisdictional (Tuck v. Tuck, Supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 260, 262, 53 Cal.Rptr. 872), and nothing could be done to correct it at any
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