Does the procedure leading to F.J's identification of appellant violate his right to due process?

identification testimony unless the ' " 'totality of the circumstances' " ' suggests ' "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." ' [Citations.]" (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 168.) " 'Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh. . . . [E]vidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.' [Citation]." (Id. at p. 170.)

The procedure leading to F.J.'s identification of appellant did not violate appellant's right to due process. Sometime after F.J. falsely identified another suspect as the shooter, his own father, Fagans, showed him a picture of appellant, which F.J. recognized immediately as the shooter. Nothing in the record suggests Fagans showed F.J. the photograph at the behest of law enforcement or was otherwise acting on behalf of the prosecution. The application of the due process clause turns on the presence of state action and is not implicated when there is no improper action by police. (Perry v. New Hampshire (2012) 565 U.S. 228, 241-242.) "The due process check for reliability. . . comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police conduct. The very purpose of the check . . .was to avoid depriving the jury of identification evidence that is reliable notwithstanding improper police conduct." (Id. at p. 241.)