Does the court abuse its discretion in partially granting and partially denying a defendant's motion to dismiss both of his prior "strike" convictions?

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in partially granting and partially denying defendant's motion to dismiss both of his prior "strike" convictions, by dismissing one and not dismissing the other. The court explained its view that it was appropriate to dismiss onebut not bothprior "strike" allegation because they were both 25 years old, because they both "[came] from the same case" and because defendant's interim convictions in 2004 and 2008 were for drug crimes and thus, did not involve "violence." These are appropriate considerations. What is more, this justification explains why the trial court nevertheless declined to dismiss the prior robbery "strike"namely, because the similarity between the prior robbery strike and the five pending robbery charges demonstrated defendant's recidivism and because the court's concern about not doubly punishing defendant for two older "strikes" suffered at the same time did not justify the dismissal of both "strikes." Because imposing additional punishment for recidivists is squarely in the heartland of the Three Strikes Law (People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096, 1099), the court acted well within its discretion in letting defendant's prior robbery "strike" stand.