Does the Attorney General's admonishment of a jury to rely solely on "reason, logic and common sense" apply to the reasonable doubt standard?

The prosecutor did encourage the jury to base its verdict on a reasoned evaluation of the evidence, but he did not misstate the beyond a reasonable doubt standard when he urged the jury to utilize "reason, logic and common sense" during deliberations. Indeed, we expect them to do nothing less. (People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 80 [jurors will "rely on their own common sense and good judgment in evaluating the weight of the evidence presented to them."].) We reject defendant's tortured construction of the argument. The prosecutor did not, as defendant suggests, remove the subjective element of the reasonable doubt standard or prohibit the jurors from factoring in how they felt. Rather, in context, he warned them not to rely on a "funny feeling" alone. To the contrary, he drew attention to the possibility of a gut feeling that a juror should bring into the deliberations and discuss with the other jurors. Nor did he convey the false notion that a reasonable doubt must be based on affirmative evidence. Again, in context, the prosecutor argued that a juror should be able to articulate doubts based on the state of the evidence, whether that is based on a complete lack of evidence or the unconvincing nature of the evidence presented. We agree with the Attorney General that it is not reasonably likely the jury interpreted the prosecutor's remarks to mean that defendant had

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