Does the doctrine of reasonable doubt apply to a defendant's due process right to appeal against a jury verdict that diminished the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt?

"The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocencethat bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.'" (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363.) Accordingly, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he [or she] is charged." (Id. at p. 364; see also People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 831 ["[T]he doctrine of reasonable doubt [applies] . . . to proof of 'each fact which is essential to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the defendant's guilt.'"].)

The People argue that defendant forfeited his right to appellate review of the trial court's comments during jury voir dire, because he did not object in the trial court that the comments diminished the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts underlying the charged enhancements. "[E]ven in the absence of an objection the accused has a right to appellate review of any instruction that affects his or her substantial rights." (People v. Johnson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 976, 984; 1259.) And here, the question of whether the trial court's comments diminished the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt affected defendant's substantial, due process right to conviction upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 984.)

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