Does the Attorney General have any authority to charge the jury on how to relate the evidence of that defense to the prosecution's general burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

"charged the jury on how to relate the evidence of that defense to the prosecution's general burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." This is a strange statement. It is true that a trial court may in appropriate circumstances give a requested jury instruction that pinpoints a defense theory of the case by, among other things, relating the reasonable doubt standard of proof to particular elements of the crime charged. (See, e.g., People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 558, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) But the Attorney General cites no case, and it would be surprising if there were one, authorizing the giving of a prosecution instruction pinpointing the defense theory over the objection of the defense. Moreover, the instruction in this case did not pinpoint a defense theory. If it "pinpointed" anything, it was a legal theory that favored the prosecution by restricting the use of circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable doubt.