Does the Attorney General have to prove that the sentence imposed by a judge in a sexual assault case was authorized?

Even if the sentence were considered authorized because it theoretically could have been imposed under section 290.006, we would still conclude that the court's error in failing to state its reasons for imposing registration was prejudicial. A sentencing error is prejudicial when " ' "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233.)

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The Attorney General claims any error was harmless because the court would have imposed registration under section 290.006. We disagree. The statute upon which the trial court relied, section 290.005, subdivision (b), does not require the court to weigh the reasons for and against registration. Indeed, nothing in the transcript of the sentencing hearing suggests the court was aware that it had discretion to impose sex offender registration after finding that the kidnapping was committed as a result of a sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. Ordinarily, when the record is silent, the trial court is presumed to have understood the scope of its discretion and followed the applicable law. (See Evid. Code, 664; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.) That presumption is inapplicable here, however, because the record affirmatively demonstrates that the court was mistaken about the scope of its discretion. The court relied upon an inapposite statute that afforded it no discretion to refrain from ordering registration. Under these circumstances, we simply cannot assume the court understood the scope of its discretion under section 290.006, a statute the court never cited or relied upon.